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The WTO and the Doha Round: Walking on Two Legs
Bernard Hoekman 
The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations, under-
way for 10 years, are in a state of paralysis as a result of disagree-
ments between major players on the extent of new liberaliza-
tion commitments, especially for nonagricultural products. 
Efforts to use the upcoming eighth WTO Ministerial Confer-
ence in December 2011 to partially “harvest” results in areas of 
particular relevance to the least-developed countries (LDCs) 
and other low-income countries—such as duty-free, quota-free 
access for LDCs and an agreement on trade facilitation—failed 
earlier this year. It has become increasingly clear that prospects 
for successfully winding up the talks in the near future are dim.  
The deadlock is costly. Assessments of the market access di-
mension of what has been negotiated to date suggest that the 
DDA could generate a global welfare (real income) boost of 
some US$160 billion (Laborde, Martin, and van der Mensbrug-
ghe 2011). This significantly underestimates the value of an 
agreement, because continued paralysis also means that the 
WTO is not delivering on its “legislative” function—the devel-
opment of new global rules of the game for national trade poli-
cies that generate negative spillovers. 
A number of observers have called on policy makers to ac-
knowledge failure, terminate the talks, and start a process of 
defining a new negotiating agenda that includes issues of great-
er salience to businesses. Others call for a shift in negotiating 
techniques and practices so as to prevent a small group of coun-
tries (or a group of small countries) from blocking agreement 
among the largest trading nations. The utility of such recom-
mendations is limited at best. The subjects that are on the table 
in the DDA—agricultural trade policies, manufactured goods, 
and services—will need to figure into any multilateral trade ne-
gotiation. The problem that is holding up agreement is not 
blocking behavior by small countries. The source of the dead-
lock that has prevailed since 2008 is disagreement among a 
small number of large players on market access. This is not 
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something smaller countries can do much about. What is need-
ed is a “critical mass” of the larger players to improve their offers 
on market access—defined both as reductions in applied barri-
ers to trade and locking-in policies through binding WTO com-
mitments.
In what follows, this note argues that the Doha Round (and 
the WTO more generally) should not be assessed primarily on 
the basis of the extent to which agreements reduce applied lev-
els of protection. The WTO is not just a marketplace in which 
countries exchange liberalization commitments; it is a vehicle 
through which governments agree on rules of the game for 
policies, and the institution through which implementation is 
monitored and negotiated rules and commitments are en-
forced. These rule-setting and enforcement dimensions of the 
WTO are very important for firms engaged in trade because 
they reduce uncertainty regarding the competition conditions 
firms will confront when exporting or investing. Uncertainty 
can be an important source of market entry and operating 
costs, and result in less investment and job creation. 
The political cycle in several major countries (such as China 
and the United States) make it unlikely that the negotiations 
will be concluded before the end of 2013. This creates an op-
portunity for WTO members to identify a forward-looking 
process and launch a work program to discuss policy matters 
that are not part of the DDA. Much has changed during the 
decade of the Doha Round. The sustained high economic 
growth rates in large emerging markets—most notably China—
have made these countries much more important as markets 
and sources of competition. The world has moved from a situa-
tion characterized by low food prices to one where prices are 
expected to remain substantially higher on average than they 
have been during recent decades, as well as more volatile. Great-
er demand for food and natural resources could potentially 
bring on a more activist use of trade-related policies that have 
negative pecuniary spillovers on trading partners. All of these 
developments call for multilateral cooperation to determine 
rules of the game for food, natural resource and climate-related 
trade policies, and to strengthen the monitoring and transpar-
ency-related activities of the WTO.
Launching a discussion of some of these issues in working 
groups under the auspices of existing WTO committees would 
ensure that time is not lost while market access negotiations in 
the Doha Round continue. The results of the deliberations 
could feed into an eventual Doha Round conclusion, but more 
realistically would aim to define an agreed upon set of follow-
on activities that would be pursued under WTO auspices.
Moving Away from the “Market Access  
Metric”
Negotiators have been working for almost 10 years to define a 
negotiating set. The contours of this set were narrowed down 
over time, especially following the 2003 Cancun ministerial, 
when potential new investment, competition, and procure-
ment disciplines were taken off the table. Since 2004, the nego-
tiations have centered primarily on a traditional market access 
and rules agenda (including disciplines on agricultural support 
policies). This agenda offers potential gains for all WTO mem-
bers, both in terms of lower barriers on goods and services ex-
ports and from a reduction in uncertainty regarding possible 
increases in levels of import protection—through greater tariff 
bindings, reductions in the average level of bound tariffs (the 
so-called ceiling tariffs that governments commit not to ex-
ceed), and specific commitments for services.1 
Average tariff levels today are much lower than just a decade 
ago, and far below the averages that prevailed in the 1980s. 
Quantitative import restrictions have largely disappeared. The 
last (2008) proposals under active discussion in the DDA 
would reduce the world average bound tariff for agricultural 
products from 40 to 30 percent and from 8 to 5 percent for 
nonagricultural goods. Average applied farm tariffs faced by de-
veloping country exporters would fall from 14.2 to 11.5 per-
cent, and those on their exports of manufactures from 2.9 to 
2.1 percent. The reductions in applied tariffs are beneficial to 
exporters and consumers, but do not appear to add up to a lot—
after all, if DDA only generates less than a 1 percentage point 
cut in the average tariff on manufactures, this clearly will not do 
much to lower prices of the goods concerned or enhance the 
ability of exporters to compete in foreign markets.
Much criticism has been based on the results of global simu-
lation models that suggest the net real income gains from any 
politically feasible DDA outcome are likely to be small in the 
aggregate: as mentioned above, what was on the table in 2008 
would generate “only” US$160 billion in additional income as 
a result of lower trade barriers. This is not insignificant and 
compares well to what was achieved in previous rounds (Mar-
tin and Messerlin 2007). Whether one regards this number as 
significant or not, this numerical lens misconstrues a critical 
function of WTO negotiations. These negotiations are not pri-
marily about reducing applied levels of protection, but center 
on establishing trade policy rules and reducing uncertainty 
through a “lock-in” of policies and binding of tariff rates, either 
at, or much closer to, applied levels. The benefits of this dimen-
sion of WTO negotiations are ignored in models simply be-
cause economists cannot quantitatively assess these features.2
The quantitative analyses also tend to underemphasize the 
fact that although tariffs are generally already low on average, 
therefore limiting the aggregate effect of further reductions, 
the formula-based negotiation modalities that have been devel-
oped will effectively eliminate all tariff peaks in Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries. The focus should therefore be on what happens to prod-
ucts and sectors where tariffs are much higher than average—ag-
ricultural products, textiles, and footwear. The same is true of 
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ate costs for consumers that are not large enough to concern 
them greatly, and negatively affect only a relatively small pro-
portion of economic agents in countries with a comparative 
advantage in specific products. But for the affected groups—
such as farmers in Brazil or coastal fishermen in West Africa—
what is on the table matters much more than what is inferred 
from looking at the reduction in average tariffs.
Tariff bindings—and more generally negotiated disciplines 
and restrictions on the ability of governments to use certain 
policies—reduce the uncertainty that is inherently associated 
with engaging in international trade. Exporters confront more 
uncertainty than do firms that operate only on their domestic 
market. National transactions and contracts can be enforced in 
national courts; there are no borders where goods may be held 
up in customs; there is no exchange rate risk to worry about; 
and so forth.  The fixed costs of getting goods into a foreign mar-
ket are higher than those associated with domestic transac-
tions. Anything that can lower the costs associated with export-
ing will both benefit existing exporters, and, more importantly, 
encourage new exporters. As foreign market entry costs fall, 
more firms will be able to start exporting to new markets. The 
associated expansion of exports along this so-called extensive 
margin of trade will boost economic welfare and growth.3 
Trade barriers may be prohibitive for a firm—a 50 percent 
tariff will be hard to overcome for most firms: negotiations that 
result in lower tariffs matter. But if tariffs are already at 5 per-
cent—and the average applied tariff in many countries today is 
often around or below that figure—variability/uncertainty in 
the taxes and regulatory regimes that apply in a market can be 
of much greater concern to firms, and have a much greater ef-
fect in impeding firms’ investment in export activity and pene-
tration of new markets. This is a key reason why trade rules 
matter—even if the associated tariff and other policy commit-
ments do no more than establish a ceiling on the level of dis-
crimination that foreign products may confront in a given mar-
ket (Francois 2001; Handley and Limão 2011). 
Advocacy for the Doha Round (and the WTO more gener-
ally) needs to center more on the effects of the negotiated rules 
and policy disciplines. Selling or criticizing the Round on the 
basis of simulated estimates of real income gains or export 
growth resulting from the application of market access formu-
lae misses much of the story. The complete ban on agricultural 
export subsidies would be a major step forward, for example, 
and cannot be quantified by estimating the impact of removing 
extant subsidies—especially in a period where high prices have 
greatly reduced the prevalence of their use. The ban is signifi-
cant because if world prices fall in the future, the decline can-
not trigger an increase in export subsidies. Maximum allowed 
levels of domestic agricultural support (subsidy ceilings) would 
fall by 70 percent in the European Union and 60 percent in the 
United States, based on 2008 modalities. Again, instead of 
stressing how much a deal will reduce the actual amount of 
subsidization, more emphasis is needed on explaining why 
such ceiling bindings are valuable. Agricultural protection and 
subsidies in OECD countries have reduced the amount of food 
that is traded internationally and led to greater instability of 
world prices, with large negative spillover effects on developing 
countries, whether exporters or importers. Disciplines on the 
ability of governments to use import or export barriers to insu-
late domestic markets, and hence make world markets thicker, 
would be a major source of welfare gain for developing coun-
tries (Martin and Anderson 2011).
Leveraging Critical Mass 
Major stakeholders in the negotiations have stressed that more 
market access concessions are needed for any Doha deal to be 
acceptable. The contours of any deal to do more to lower ap-
plied barriers to trade and agricultural support need to be pur-
sued by the large players on a critical mass basis. A key feature of 
critical mass agreements is that they need not involve all of the 
WTO membership. Instead, they imply agreement among the 
large players, with the associated benefits extended to all WTO 
members (that is, those who are not part of a deal are allowed to 
“free ride”). Such an approach is nothing new for the WTO; in 
practice, negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) were always limited to those countries with 
the greatest interest in a particular area or set of products, with 
whatever was eventually agreed upon being extended to all 
members as a result of the most favored nation (MFN) rule. 
The threshold for agreement has tended to be around 90 per-
cent, that is, some 90 percent of the trade involved in an area or 
set of products needed to be between the participating coun-
tries. A recent example of a critical mass agreement is the Infor-
mation Technology Agreement, but tariff negotiations in earli-
er GATT rounds also conform to this rule of thumb (Hoekman 
and Kostecki 2009).
To date, efforts to extend what is on the table on market ac-
cess have centered on sectoral approaches and proposals for 
trade in goods. Developed countries with already low average 
tariffs have argued that they have little left with which to nego-
tiate and induce emerging market countries to significantly 
lower their applied tariffs. This argument neglects the fact that 
concessions need not be limited to merchandise tariffs—they 
can involve agricultural policies, the procedural rules affecting 
antidumping, and others. Other elements of the DDA offer sig-
nificant scope for countries to expand the level of their com-
mitments; services is one such area. Services negotiations have 
been sidelined for much of the post-2001 period, in part be-
cause of a decision that services talks would commence in full 
force only after a deal on agricultural and nonagricultural mar-
ket access modalities was concluded. 
Trade and investment in services is inhibited by myriad pol-
icy barriers that are more restrictive than those applying to 
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ticularly important from a welfare and growth perspective, be-
cause new varieties of goods and services account for a large 
part of the potential gains from liberalization. This is a feature 
of the DDA that is rarely sufficiently emphasized in discussions 
of what is on the table. It is not only the effect of a given reduc-
tion in trade costs on existing trade flows that generate benefits, 
more important is that agreements that lower trade costs will 
generate new trade.
Defining the Future Path to Be Pursued 
There are many systemically important issues that the DDA 
does not address. One reason for concluding the DDA as rap-
idly as possible is to be able to move on to address these other 
significant issues. Indeed, a precondition for successful conclu-
sion of the talks is likely to be agreement to engage in efforts to 
cooperate in areas that are currently off the table. Some of these 
issues are well known and have given rise to tensions and dis-
putes, for example: biofuel subsidies and other types of “green” 
industrial policy measures; the possible use of carbon border 
adjustment as part of domestic climate change mitigation pro-
grams; export taxes on inputs to support domestic downstream 
industries; and export restrictions on food products as part of 
an effort to insulate domestic markets. Other important and 
currently off-the-table issues include discrimination in govern-
ment procurement; restrictions on foreign ownership of assets 
(natural resources, real estate, enterprises in sensitive sectors); 
and allegations of anticompetitive behavior by multinationals 
or state-owned enterprises.
There is also an important agenda revolving around increas-
ing the transparency of WTO member policies, including non-
tariff measures and what members do in the context of prefer-
ential trade agreements. The financial crisis revealed major gaps 
in the available information on trade and investment policies. 
WTO notification requirements are often not satisfied on a 
timely basis, if at all. In some areas—trade finance, for example—
there are no global databases on flows and prices. Very little is 
known about applied government procurement practices. 
There are no comprehensive depositories of information on 
nontariff measures applied by WTO members. Concrete ac-
tions to enhance both monitoring and analysis of trade and in-
vestment policies and their effects—including the extent to 
which countries use policies to discriminate in favor of national 
firms and specific trading partners in the context of preferential 
trade agreements—will help the WTO fulfill its role of sustain-
ing an open and nondiscriminatory multilateral trading system.
Space constraints prevent a substantive discussion of the is-
sues that WTO members arguably need to come to grips with. 
The main point here is to recognize that there are various issues 
that concern all WTO members and that call for multilateral 
cooperation and agreement on the rules of the game that 
should be followed to maintain an open trading system. Agree-
ing on a process to address these matters, or, at the very least, to 
are locked in through binding WTO commitments is limited 
(Gootiiz and Mattoo 2009). This matters for a number of rea-
sons, but most important is that the productivity, and thus 
competitiveness, of both goods and services firms depends on 
access to low-cost and high-quality producer services such as 
telecommunications, transport, finance, and distribution. Ser-
vices have assumed added significance in the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis. Because services account for most nonla-
bor costs of production, action to improve the efficiency of ser-
vices must be a major policy focus in deficit countries, comple-
menting policies to switch the pattern of expenditures and 
reduce net consumption. Expanding domestic consumption 
and investment in surplus countries must also focus on servic-
es—including social and health insurance services, pension 
fund/asset management, and so forth. Expanding the scope for 
international trade and investment in services can help support 
the required structural changes. 
The market access outcome of the DDA would be greatly 
enhanced if a critical mass of the 15–20 or so largest WTO 
members were to agree to bind current levels of openness. The 
associated reduction in uncertainty would be valuable to firms 
and encourage greater investment (Hoekman and Mattoo 
2010). In addition, if these countries could negotiate a package 
of liberalization commitments organized around clusters of 
services that are critical to business users and the smooth func-
tioning of the global economy—such as logistics and supply 
chain management—they could significantly enhance the rele-
vance of the DDA to global business.
Another DDA area that is of great potential importance 
from a market access perspective is trade facilitation. The costs 
created by inefficient trade facilitation—both monetary, and, 
more importantly, those resulting from delays and uncertainty 
associated with clearance and regulatory compliance—can be 
greater than the cost of paying tariffs on the affected imports. 
Recent trade literature has documented the importance of 
trade costs as a determinant of whether firms export; that ex-
porters tend to be among the most productive firms; and that 
the productivity effect of greater trade—deriving from both im-
ports and exports—is an important driver of overall economic 
growth. Most firms do not export, and those that do often sell 
into only a few markets. Major factors explaining this include 
lack of information, difficulties in obtaining credit, and the 
various costs associated with entering each new export market. 
Trade clearance and associated regulatory compliance require-
ments are elements of such market entry costs that impede 
smaller firms from participating in export activities.
A trade facilitation agreement that reduces such costs will 
expand trade along what trade economists call the “intensive” 
and “extensive” margin. The first of these refers to greater ex-
ports of products that are already being shipped to a given mar-
ket; the second describes new exports—either new markets or 
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define where/how they are best addressed, will provide assur-
ances that issues of interest to all WTO members will be ad-
dressed in the future. For example, systematic exchange rate 
undervaluation is a matter that some observers have argued 
needs to be addressed through WTO rules so that the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism can be used to determine in-
stances where a member should be allowed to impose trade 
barriers on imports originating in a country that has been 
found to engage in deliberate undervaluation. At the moment, 
the WTO does not provide this possibility, other than GATT 
Article XV,4 which delegates to the International Monetary 
Fund the task of determining whether a country is using ex-
change rate intervention to “frustrate the intent of the provi-
sions of the GATT.” There are good conceptual and practical 
reasons why the WTO does not include disciplines in this area, 
and compelling arguments why efforts to go down this path are 
likely to do much more harm than good in terms of sustaining 
multilateral cooperation.5  Whatever one’s views, however, clar-
ifying what is and what is not subject to rules and what are per-
missible policies to promote investment in/production of trad-
ables is important in defining the boundaries of the WTO.
A major element of any future agenda is to further reduce 
barriers to trade and investment in services and more generally 
address the effect of regulatory policies in segmenting markets, 
including so-called nontariff measures. Given that countries 
may have legitimate concerns about the effects of liberalization 
because of inadequate or the absence of regulation, the post-
Doha Round action agenda should include developing mecha-
nisms through which WTO members can engage each other on 
regulatory policies affecting the contestability of markets. 
The WTO could do much more to offer effective mecha-
nisms through which members can learn from each other on 
how to design and implement regulatory systems that support 
greater trade while attaining underlying regulatory objectives. 
Regulators, trade and economic affairs officials, the business 
community, and other stakeholders need to work together to 
assess current policies and options for improving regulation in 
a specific area and determine how cooperation between regula-
tors could facilitate more trade. Instituting a parallel process 
that does not involve negotiations but that instead focuses on 
the substance of regulation (or the effects of a lack of appropri-
ate regulation) could help countries improve regulatory out-
comes and facilitate an expansion in trade. Such processes 
should extend to regular, systematic discussion and multilater-
al scrutiny of preferential trade agreement implementation, 
with the goal of identifying good practices that could be widely 
adopted by WTO members. Creating such mechanisms for ex-
change and learning can help avoid a recurrence of the DDA 
experience with the Singapore issues and help prepare the 
ground for future negotiations on services.6 
Moving forward to discuss new issues of common interest 
need not wait for the conclusion of the Doha Round. Adding 
new subjects to the agenda may eventually help conclude the 
Round, although a good case can be made that there is already 
more than enough on the table, if more is worked out on the 
services front and the appropriate weight is given to the value of 
binding policies as opposed to only actual liberalization of ap-
plied policies. The main point, however, is that if the talks con-
tinue to drag on for some time, the hiatus provides an opportu-
nity to launch discussions under auspices of the relevant WTO 
committees on subjects such as those noted above. The oppor-
tunity cost of waiting for the DDA to conclude is increased sub-
stantially if it means delaying discussions on systemically im-
portant matters that are not currently on the DDA agenda and 
require cooperative solutions. 
Conclusion 
Concluding the Doha Round is important in itself and for sus-
taining the cooperation that has resulted in the current open 
rules-based multilateral trade regime. Continued paralysis is 
costly for the system because it prevents progress on the legisla-
tive side—the negotiation and agreement on rules of the game 
in new as well as old areas that are important for global markets’ 
operation. The WTO offers a multilateral umbrella under 
which the major trading powers can agree on how to manage 
and support the needed process of “global rebalancing.” Using 
the WTO to map out rules of the game is likely to be much 
more productive than the pursuit of unilateral policies to deal 
with policy externalities—both in terms of supporting the 
needed structural transformation and in maintaining an open 
trading system. 
Abstracting from the need to put in place mechanisms to 
support a process of building trust and understanding on how to 
address the market-segmenting effects of domestic regulation, 
moving forward arguably does not require fundamental changes 
to the WTO negotiating process. There has been much discus-
sion in this regard about the Single Undertaking: the notion that 
nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This is clearly a fac-
tor that can slow down the process of getting to yes. One solution 
that is often proposed is a greater reliance on plurilateral agree-
ments that bind only those countries willing to sign on, who 
then may decide not to accord the benefits of what has been 
agreed to nonsignatories. The main reason to consider plurilater-
als is to avoid free riding—an issue that arises if some large coun-
tries do not want to join. However, this is not the source of the 
current deadlock—the problem is that some large countries want 
more than other large countries are willing to offer.7
The Single Undertaking also has benefits—it enhances the 
legitimacy of any negotiated outcome. But it does imply an op-
portunity cost if agreements in specific areas must wait for an 
overall deal agreement. If such areas also generate little in the 
way of reciprocity value—that is, the issue is not something that 
trading partners care much about—carving them out of the 
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ing chips off the table that could have been used to link to other 
issues. Alternatively, if the gains and costs of agreement in a spe-
cific area are balanced, a carve-out also comes at little cost from 
a linkage perspective. The best example of such an issue of the 
first type is duty-free, quota-free access for LDCs, because this 
is an action that does not entail any reciprocity by the LDCs. 
An example of the second possibility is trade facilitation. Since 
inefficient trade facilitation generates mostly socially wasteful 
costs—as opposed to rents or government revenues—moving 
forward on trade facilitation is important from an economic 
welfare perspective, and would come at low cost from a “link-
age foregone” perspective, because most of the benefits accrue 
to the countries that take actions to improve facilitation. In-
deed, in an area such as trade facilitation, given that most of the 
benefits accrue to the countries that pursue reforms, govern-
ments should simply do so rather than incur the opportunity 
costs of waiting for a deal to be struck at the WTO.
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Notes
1. See Martin and Mattoo (forthcoming) for a recent compre-
hensive assessment the state of play in the DDA.
2. For a more extensive treatment of some of these arguments, 
see Hoekman, Martin, and Mattoo (2010).
3. Recent empirical research has shown that the indirect pro-
ductivity effects associated with opening markets to new im-
ported varieties of goods account for 10 to 25 percent of the 
typical country’s per capita income growth (Broda, Greenfield, 
and Weinstein 2010). On the export side of the equation, the 
magnitude of the productivity gains from reducing trade costs 
come from the expansion of trade along the extensive margin, 
driven by a process of intraindustry adjustment in which the 
less productive firms exit and the more productive ones expand 
(see Redding [2010] for a survey of the recent literature). 
4. See http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e 
.htm.
5. The level of the exchange rate is not a policy instrument on 
which a government can make specific commitments. It is en-
dogenous, and will reflect a mix of fiscal and monetary policies. 
Whether a government is engaging in deliberate undervalua-
tion is inherently a subjective exercise that requires judgment. 
Even if this assessment if left to the International Monetary 
Fund—as is required by the relevant WTO provision (GATT 
Article XV) dealing with exchange rates—it will be very diffi-
cult to objectively assess to what extent a country is undercut-
ting its trade policy commitments to liberalize access to its mar-
kets and/or is subsidizing its exports. There are many other 
objectives that may underpin an active exchange rate manage-
ment policy that have nothing to do with seeking to circumvent 
trade policy commitments. For a detailed analysis and discus-
sion, see Staiger and Sykes (2010). 
6. For an elaboration of these arguments, see Hoekman and 
Mattoo (2010). The Singapore issues refer to transparency in 
government procurement, investment policy, competition pol-
icy, and trade facilitation. In 1997, the WTO established work-
ing groups for each of these subjects to determine whether to 
launch negotiations in these areas. No agreement could be 
reached in the cases of procurement, investment, and competi-
tion policies (see Hoekman and Kostecki [2009]).
7. Plurilateral agreements differ from critical mass agreements 
in that the latter apply on a MFN basis—that is, they permit free 
riding by those that are not part of the critical mass.
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